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Talk about losing sight of the forest for the trees! What I 
trust interests readers is what to make of the equal protection 
twist in Bush v. Gore, not an exchange of volleys between schol-
ars. That exchange having descended from the trivial to the ab-
surd/ I want to return to the substance of the equal protection 
issue that has perplexed Bush v. Gore's observers from day one. 
It is worth noting initially Professor Lund's inability to dispute 
the per curiam opinion's conspicuous failure to identify any indi-
vidual voters, or groups of voters, who were treated unequally by 
the Florida Supreme Court's ballot counting scheme. Nor could 
he dispute my argument that the deviations present in the Flor-
ida court's recount order were characteristic of the degrees and 
kinds of deviations that a reasonable reading of Reynolds v. Sims 
and its progeny permitted. 2 Rather than engaging these argu-
ments, Professor Lund has replied with a barrage of technical, 
literalist defenses of both his Carnival of Mirrors and the Court's 
opinion. I have space in this response to address only two of 
Lund's replies. 
First is Professor Lund's assertion that the remedy in Bush 
v. Gore did not "foreclose the Florida court from ordering a new 
recount."3 Lund is, of course, technically correct that the per cu-
* Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School. 
I. Exemplifying Professor Lund's latest assault on my scholarship is his decision to 
pounce on my mistake of writing that Lund had described something I had written about 
Bush v. Gore as "unexceptional," when in fact he had actually used the word "unexcep-
tionable." See Nelson Lund, Carnival of Mirrors: Laurence Tribe's "Unbearable Wrong-
ness", 19 Const. Comm. 609 & note 3 (2003) ("Carnivaf'). Professor Lund's Carnival had 
responded to Laurence H. Tribe, The Unbearable Wrongness of Bush v. Gore, 19 Const. 
Comm. 571 (2003) ("Unbearable Wrongness"). Why anyone would make so much of an 
obviously unintentional error whose correction wouldn't have weakened my point in the 
slightest is a mystery to me. 
2. See Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 582-84,585-87 (cited in note 1). 
3. Lund, Carnival at 615 (cited in note 1). 
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riam opinion didn't order the Florida Supreme Court in so many 
words to toss in the towel.4 But anyone who could seriously de-
pict the opinion as a mere suggestion that the Florida court con-
sider it quits would fail to see the humor in the cartoon cap-
tioned: '"Shut up!', he explained." Even assuming the leeway the 
Court theoretically left open was real, the window it had failed 
to slam shut was hardly the sort of opening through which any-
one would dare to crawl. To describe the opinion's language5 as 
only encouraging an end to the dispute is a gross understate-
ment. The Court's "time 's-up!" decree readily explains why 
nearly every observer, including Vice President Gore, under-
stood the decision to end the Election 2000 dispute.6 
More fundamentally, the alleged December 12 "dead-
line" -cited by the per curiam opinion two hours before that 
midnight as the justification for finding that a uniform recount 
could not proceed-was not, as Lund suggests, the result of the 
Florida Supreme Court's "own ... questionable interpretation of 
the state statutes."7 To the contrary, it was the U.S. Supreme 
Court that cobbled the deadline together from a variety of opin-
ions that, viewed individually or collectively, could not support 
the proposition that Florida law-as written or as authoritatively 
construed-imposed a hard-and-fast deadline on the recount 
process. Justice Shaw, who dissented from the Florida Supreme 
Court decision that ruled in favor of Vice President Gore, ex-
plained that "December 12 was [never] a 'drop-dead' date under 
Florida law," but "was simply a permissive 'safe-harbor' date to 
which the states could aspire. It certainly was not a mandatory 
contest deadline under the plain language of the Florida Elec-
tion Code (i.e., it is not mentioned there) or this Court's prior 
rulings. "8 And the prior opinions on which the Court explicitly 
relied merely discussed "the Florida Secretary of State's author-
ity to reject late returns arising from a pre-certification protest 
4. The Court did close with the traditional phrase remanding the dispute to the 
Florida court for "proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 
98, 111 (2000). 
5. Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 589 n.78 (cited in note 1). 
6. See, e.g., Gore, 773 So. 2d at 529 (Shaw, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
"tenor" of Bush v. Gore precluded the Florida Supreme Court from crafting "a remedy 
under these circumstances that would have met the due process, equal protection, and 
other concerns of the United States Supreme Court"); Lund, Carnival at 616 n.32 (cited 
in note 1) (citing Ron K.Iain's belief that the Court's decision "seemed to have the word 
'stop' written on it in really big letters"). 
7. Lund, Carnival at 614 (cited in note 1). 
8. Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 528-29 (Fla. Dec. 22, 2000) (Shaw, J., concur-
ring). 
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action, not ... a court's obligation to stop a recount in a post-
certification contest action. To mix these two actions is to con-
fuse apples and oranges."9 The U.S. Supreme Court was the only 
court to find "a legislative wish to take advantage of the 'safe 
harbor'" 10 in the relevant context of that contest phase. 
Finally, even if the Florida court had explicitly read the De-
cember 12 date as a binding deadline, deferring to that "inter-
pretation" contradicted the Court's equal protection holding. 
The Court did not deny the Florida court's conclusion on De-
cember 8 that hundreds of ballots had been lawfully cast under 
Florida law-evinced by partial and completed recounts 11 -yet 
were not tallied in Katherine Harris's certified count. 12 Throwing 
out these ballots to satisfy a non-mandatory safe harbor provi-
sion systematically and arbitrarily "diluted" to zero the weight of 
hundreds of votes for no reason other than the inadequacy of the 
vote counting machines in their home counties. And Professor 
Lund neither explains nor justifies the Court's willingness to tol-
erate the fact that, in the count certified by Harris, some coun-
ties had completed manual recounts including overvotes while 
some had not, or the fact that some counties never completed 
the statutorily required automatic recount at all. 13 
Professor Lund's only response is a procedural cheap-shot: 
" [ t ]he Court was not obliged to somehow anticipate and accept 
Professor Tribe's unlitigated, post hoc claims." 14 Even if this de-
scription were accurate, the Bush v. Gore majority most cer-
9. Id at 529 n.l2 (internal citations omitted). Justice Shaw's point is illustrated by 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1237 (Fla. Nov. 21, 2000) 
(arguing that the Secretary of State may ignore late returns in an initial certification if 
doing so would preclude "Florida voters from participating fully in the federal electoral 
process" but saying nothing of a final deadline in an election contest); and Palm Beach 
County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1289 (Fla. Dec. 11, 2000) (discussing 3 
U.S.C. § 5 only in relation to the Secretary of State's "discretion to ignore amended re-
turns" in a protest to an election certification). 
10. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000); see also 
John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775, 790 (2001) 
("Indeed, the per curiam's sudden introduction of the December 12 cutoff date for a 
remedy-based on the assumption that the Florida legislature intended to adopt the safe 
harbor date for the selection of presidential electors provided for by 3 USC § 5-makes 
almost no sense at all unless read in light of the concurrence's structural analysis."). 
II. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 2000). 
12. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1258-62 (Fla. 2000). I have discussed nu-
merous other inequalities in the underlying count elsewhere. See Tribe, Unbearable 
Wrongness at 584 (cited in note 1); Laurence H. Tribe, eroG .v hsuB and its Disguises: 
Freeing Bush v. Gore from its Hall of Mirrors, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 170,258-63 (2001). 
13. See Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 580-81 (cited in note 1); see also Tribe, 115 
Harv. L. Rev. at 261 (cited in note 12). 
14. Lund, Carnival at 615 n.31 (cited in note 1). 
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tainly was obliged to respond to the arguments made by the dis-
senting Justices who argued that reading a December 12 dead-
line into the Florida election code-thereby ending any realistic 
chance of an amended recount-would violate the very equal 
protection principle through which the Court invalidated the re-
count.15 But Lund's cheap shot isn't just cheap; it's wrong. My 
brief on behalf of Vice President Gore plainly did argue that the 
equal protection theory of Petitioner Bush would apply equally 
to the disparities present in the underlxing count and in the 
counts certified in numerous other states. 6 And even if it hadn't, 
Professor Lund should have perhaps thought twice before mock-
ing my failure to say explicitly that the underlying count certified 
by Katherine Harris was plagued with unconstitutional inequali-
ties more serious and numerous than the count ordered by the 
Florida Supreme Court. After all, my client, whom I was bound 
by law to represent faithfully, believed that neither the underly-
ing count nor the Florida court's ordered recount violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment. For him, the dispute was solely about 
Florida election law. It seems odd indeed to fault the Vice Presi-
dent, who believed he had won a majority of Florida's popular 
votes in accord with Florida's laws, for not wanting to make a 
federal case out of it. 
15. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 126-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Florida law 
holds that all ballots that reveal the intent of the voter constitute valid votes. Recognizing 
these principles, the majority nonetheless orders the termination of the contest proceed-
ing before all such votes have been tabulated. Under their own reasoning, the appropri-
ate course of action would be to remand to allow more specific procedures for imple-
menting the legislature's uniform general standard to be established."); id at 147 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) ("By halting the manual recount, and thus ensuring that the un-
counted legal votes will not be counted under any standard, this Court crafts a rem-
edy ... [that] harms the very fairness interests the Court is attempting to protect. ... 
[V]oters already arrive at the polls with an unequal chance that their votes will be 
counted. I do not see how the fact that this results from counties' selection of different 
voting machines rather than a court order makes the outcome any more fair."). 
16. See Brief of Respondent Albert Gore, Jr., at 35-36, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 
(2000) ("Of course, so long as the count is conducted by humans, it undeniably will be 
possible to allege some degree of inconsistency in the treatment of individual ballots .... 
That will be true in every one of the many jurisdictions that provide for manual recounts; 
it is true whenever States provide for variation in the methods of voting from county to 
county (e.g., optical scanners as opposed to less reliable punch card ballots), which is now 
the case in every State; and it was true everywhere prior to the introduction of mechani-
cal voting machines, when all ballots were counted by hand. Petitioners' theory .waul? 
mean that all of these practices violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, 1f peti-
tioners mean to say that all votes must be tabulated under a fixed and mechanical stan-
dard (e.g., the 'two-comer chad rule'), their approach would render unconstitutional the 
laws of States that hinge the meaning of the ballot on the intent of the voter-and also 
would mean that the Constitution requires the disenfranchisement of many voters whose 
intent is clearly discernible. This argument, in our view, is wholly insubstantial."). 
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The second of Professor Lund's arguments that space per-
mits me to address is his accusation that I have invented out of 
thin air a political process doctrine with no relationship to the 
opinions in Bush v. Gore. 17 To be sure, my articulation of that 
doctrine takes a fresh look at, and revises, the traditional formu-
lation of Baker v. Carr. 18 Again, Professor Lund is technically 
correct-neither Justice Breyer nor Justice Souter uttered the 
magic words: "this case is nonjusticiable under the political ques-
tion doctrine." Yet both made numerous arguments that em-
ployed the essential building blocks of the doctrine I have articu-
lated.19 And the "conflat[ion of] the . . . doctrine of non-
justiciable political questions" with arguments "about the proper 
exercise of judicial discretion"20 is hardly an invention to which I 
can lay claim. To the contrary, this conflation is pervasive in con-
stitutional law. Nonjusticiability is often articulated through ar-
guments about ripeness and reminders of the passive virtues, a 
point aptly illustrated by the Court's unanimous decision in 
Growe v. Emison, about which Professor Lund is silent.21 
Doctrinal labels are notoriously misleading; at times, their 
false advertising can lure even the most sophisticated of observ-
ers into a hall of mirrors that distorts more than it reveals. But in 
the case of Bush v. Gore, it takes relatively little sophistication-
just a resistance to sophistry-to recognize how far one must 
twist equal protection law to make it fit the decision's mold. 
17. See Lund, Carnival at 616-18 (cited in note 1). 
18. See Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 593-601 (cited in note 1). 
19. ld. at 604-05. 
20. Lund, Carnival at 618 (cited in note 1). 
21. See Tribe, Unbearable Wrongness at 598-99,605-06 (cited in note 1). 
